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Abstract 
In this paper I show how the imaging and representation of war is becoming ever more central 
to its conduct: warfare is being fought through what I call ‘image-fare’. I focus on the 23-day 
war on Gaza that began on the 27
th
 December 2008, and make four interconnected claims about 
the relationship between visuality, law and violence. First, the strategic use of images by the 
Israeli military in Gaza served a legitimizing function that positions Israel as always and already 
the lawful victim, scripting Hamas as terroristic perpetrators, belonging to a resolutely “hostile” 
space (i.e. Gaza). Second, these visualities ‘work’ via the appeal to the immediacy of images; 
Israel insists on the factual, and thus legal, veracity of its own visual forms while rendering their 
– Palestinian – visual forms voyeuristic and intrinsically biased. Third, contesting these 
visualities and exposing the inconsistencies of the Israeli framing is difficult when taking into 
account the ways in which the visual fields of war are structured by ‘visual economies’ which 
regulate and mediate global media, and which construct new publics in the process of doing so. 
Wary of overstating the power of Israeli framings, while understating the possibilities of 
challenging those framings, I finish by considering what role the circulation of the visual archive 
might have in challenging Israeli visualities. 
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Gaza’s visual fields 
 On the 27
th
 December 2008 Israel launched ‘Operation Cast-Lead’, a fully-fledged 
military attack upon the Gaza Strip. Weeks earlier, on November 4
th
, the Israeli Defence Force 
(IDF) instituted a ban on the entry of foreign journalists into Gaza. The ban was not eased until 
after the fighting had ‘stopped’ three weeks later when Israel finally declared a ceasefire. Foreign 
press could not gain access to Gaza so the IDF stationed them beyond the ‘closed military zone’ 
two kilometres away from the action atop Parash Hill, a tourist spot above the Israeli town of 
Sderot. But why would the IDF ban journalists from Gaza, and why did it allow them to cover 
the asault from a hilltop? If the aim was to stop sensitive and potentially damaging images from 
being seen then the ban failed miserably: Death and destruction were photographed and filmed 
extensively by the Palestinian journalists already in Gaza – and these images were published in 
the international press. But what if the aim was never to stop images from getting out? What if, 
as David Campbell (forthcoming) has argued, the aim was not about prohibiting the circulation 
of images but rather  permitting the circulation of some while politicizing others as inevitably 
biased?  
 In her last book, Regarding the pain of others, Susan Sontag drew attention to the long-
standing relationship between photography and modern war. Sontag may not have been the first 
to suggest that modern war is waged with images but her work demonstrated that the connection 
has become definitive: If we are going to talk about war then we have to talk about the 
presentation and representation of war. Sontag was primarily concerned with photographs but 
today the visual fields of war are structured by new and multiple forms of visual media. 
Governments now have their own Youtube channels; key figured of politics and the military 
have become Facebook and Twitter fanatics; embedded journalists are attached to militaries on 
the front lines and war can now be witnessed from the perspective of a missile as it whistles 
toward its victims. These new visual media mean that audiences are experiencing and witnessing 
war in complex and diversifying ways, but the turn toward the visual (see Macdonald et al 2010; 
Campbell 2007) also produces and constitutes these audiences and publics in the process.  
 Today the visual frames and discourses of modern war are being recruited to mandate a 
field of perceptibility which impels publics toward certain apprehensions of war. These frames 
build an interpretation that according to Judith Butler (2009: 100) “constrains what can be heard, 
read, seen, felt and known”.  And so at stake in the mandating of perspective is the very ontology 
of war, forcing us to ask: what and whose account will count as ‘real’? The state, Judith Butler 
(2009: 66) claims, has an “orchestrative power” to ratify what will be called reality and we have 
recently witnessed, in both Israel and the U.S., a concerted effort to regulate the visual field to do 
just this. But framing and regulating are not only concerned with the visible and the invisible but 
their constitutive relation, not what is seen but how what is seen. These are not theoretical 
precepts: A powerful visual and discursive framing of war is currently taking place around what 
are being called the ‘new wars’ (see Kaldor 2006; Münkler 2005). The new wars discourse 
delineates a Manichean geography between the way that states and non-state (or pre-state) actors 
fight war. As Derek Gregory (2010: 266) has pointed out, advanced militaries go to great lengths 
to represent their own operations as “surgical, sensitive and scrupulous” and this turn toward 
‘clean war’ is part of what Christopher Coker (2004) has called the “re-enchantment of war”. But 
as Gregory insists, it is only ‘our’ wars that are re-enchanted. The same militaries that insist on 
the humaneness of ‘our’ wars direct public attention to an enemy which is “indiscriminate, 
insensitive and illegitimate” (pp. 267). These broader frames of war intersect closely with 
Israel’s1 framing of Gaza. 
 In this paper I show how the imaging and representation of war is becoming ever more 
central to its conduct: warfare is being fought through what I call ‘image-fare’. Using Israel’s 
ban on international media as a focal point, I make four interconnected claims.  First, Israel’s 
strategic use of images helped to legitimise the assault on Gaza. Two framing devices were 
essential: First, Israeli visualities construct Israel as victim. Second, the designation of Gaza as a 
‘hostile entity’ prefigures Gaza and Hamas as the perpetrator.  
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 The use of ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ denotes a collective and requires justification. I recognise that ‘Israel’ has many 
different meanings across many different people and understand that not all Israeli’s share the same opinion and 
ideas about how the state of Israel conducts its activities. I acknowledge an internal Israeli politics and give voice to 
the marginal (but perhaps growing) dissenting voices in spaces such as: the academy; the boycott; journalism 
(especially Haaretz); the army (especially Breaking the Silence); the anti-occupation movement; activist politics and 
exile.  It is critical to acknowledge that while there is a critical Left in Israel, the overwhelming political attitude 
supports the status quo of Occupation and has done so for a long time. While the ‘Israeli’ narrative is therefore 
concerned with Israeli politics, it is also necessarily much more than capital ‘P’ Politics. As Eyal Weizmann (2008) 
has pointed, out there exists a statist imaginary within Israeli society; the line between official and non-official 
scripts, between public and private is increasingly blurred.  While not without problem, ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ are 
useful descriptive categories that capture a dominant (albeit complex and heterogeneous) set of assumptions. 
 
 Second, the Israeli narrative appeals to the immediacy of images, insisting on the factual, 
and thus legal, veracity of the visual form, or rather, its own visual forms. Israel implores 
international audiences to see what they believe when it comes to showing Israel as victim or 
Hamas as terroristic. Seeing is unmediated, Israel claims: images speak the truth. These 
visualities are then used to make and substantiate a series of legal claims about the enemy. These 
claims reproduce Gaza as a lawless space while depicting Israel as law-abiding – and again a 
clear victim and perpetrator are availed.  
 Third, Palestinian footage and images of death and suffering must not be interpreted as 
necessarily effective in contesting the visualities of war deployed by Israel.  Israel’s decision to 
ban journalists was based on the assumption that it could control what was seen and known of 
the assault on Gaza and yet ironically Israel ended up ensuring that international audiences saw 
more Palestinian coverage than ever before. However, the visual fields of Gaza are much more 
complex than reading one set of images against another: Palestinian visualities cannot simply be 
taken as necessarily ‘countering’ anything merely because they are Palestinian. Taking serious 
the notion that images work within what Deborah Poole and David Campbell have called the 
‘visual economy’ I focus on the ways in which ostensibly critical visualizations of Gaza were 
blunted by three ‘economies of regulation’.  First, international press edit and censor suffering 
and death in the name of ‘taste and decency’. Second, ‘balanced’ reporting has meant that 
Palestinian suffering was often represented alongside Israeli suffering, drawing a problematic 
moral and political equivalence between the two. Finally, the pictoral coverage of Gaza ends up 
producing the assault as a temporary humanitarian catastrophe rather than a political episode of 
carefully planned and orchestrated violence. 
 Wary of overstating the power of Israeli framings while understating the possibilities of 
challenging those framings, I finish by considering what role the circulation of the visual archive 
might have in challenging Israeli and IDF visualities. 
Hasbara 
 Israel’s blanket media ban was never about the suppression of “truth”; rather, it was a 
way of organizing and disciplining the gaze of the international community so that some things 
could be seen while others remained hidden from view. The ban was not therefore an attempt to 
“keep Gaza hidden” David Campbell (forthcoming: 10) has argued, “it was an attempt to 
politicise the hundreds of pictures that emerged daily as inevitably ‘biased’”. Limiting the 
availability of images was part of a wider effort to produce a particular visualization of the 
conflict. It was not incidental that the international media covered the assault from the hills of 
Sdreot. As Ariella Azoulay (2009) argues, the position helped construct a particular war: “From 
their observation point, what they see is exactly the picture that Israel wishes to show: a war 
fought on equal footing by two sides. Missiles launched in Gaza hit Israel, and Israel retaliates.” 
This imaging levels the asymmetries of the conflict, but the distant positioning of the cameras 
also works to elide the death and suffering beneath and after the smoke and bombs that so 
resemble the ‘shock and awe’ doctrine. The camera at distance, just like the view through the 
scope of the aerial targeting device, erases bodies from the landscape of war, or as Lillie 
Chouliaraki (2009: 225) has put it, “Western media broadcast from positions of showing that 
exclude the witnessing of human death and render the reporting of this war an exercise in 
military action”. The media ban disciplined our gaze, instructing us not only what to see, but 
compelling us how to see what we see.   
Figure 1. IDF Spokesperson YouTube channel. Screenshot, source: YouTube 
 
 Once the ban was in place the National Information Directorate (NID)
2
 was tasked with 
explaining Israel’s position to the world. The word for explanation in Hebrew is “hasbara”, but 
pejoratively it also means spin and propaganda (Shabi 2009). The directorate’s chief, Yarden 
Vatikai, pointed out that the “hasbara apparatus needed a body that would coordinate its 
agencies, coordinate the messages and become a platform for cooperation between all the 
agencies that deal with communication relations and public diplomacy” (quoted in Shabi 2009). 
The internet and the new/social media were an essential component of the hasbara campaign and 
as soon as the first bombs were dropped, the IDF Spokesperson Unit (IDF-SU) launched its own 
YouTube channel (figure 1). The channel was set up to detail “the IDF's humane action and 
operational success in Operation Cast Lead” (IDF 2009) and it soon became the most subscribed 
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 The NID was established in 2007 at the recommendation of the Winograd Comission, a commission headed by 
Eliyahu Winograd with the mandate to investigate the events that took place in (and leading upto) the 2006 Lebanon 
war. The main findings were published in an interim report in April 2007, followed by a final report which was 
published in January 2008 (MFA 2008). One of the key recommendations of the report was that the IDF should put 
more effort into PR. The NID was established as a corrective to the IDF failures in Lebanon in 2006 and was tasked 
with “synchronizing the content and tone of Israel's message in subsequent military theatres” (Kuntsman and Stein 
2010).  
Israeli website ever, attracting over 2 million views by the end of the assault (Anderson 2009). In 
tandem with the YouTube channel Israeli officials delivered private briefings to international 
bloggers and maintained personal video blogs. “In testament to the efficacy of the image, Israel 
mounted video cameras at the Kerem Shalom crossing in order to broadcast – online, in real time 
– its transfer of humanitarian goods into Gaza after the assault” (Kuntsman and Stein 2010). The 
short messaging website Twitter was used for the first time; the Israeli consulate in New York 
opened its own Twitter account two days after the start of the offensive, holding Twitter-based 
press conferences that were later lauded as having “revolutionized Israeli diplomacy” (Shamir 
2009). But some of the fiercest efforts made by Israel were in the domain of popular internet 
usage. In an effort to stem ‘anti-Israel sentiment’, the Foreign Ministry “recruited undercover 
volunteers to deliver the state-sponsored war message to the Internet (sic) public through the 
informal language of the “talkback”” (Kuntsman and Stein 2010). The campaign focused on 
European websites, where audiences were thought to be particularly hostile to Israel. This project 
was formally added to the state budget in 2009 under the rubric “internet warfare team.” In the 
words of the deputy director of the Foreign Ministry’s hasbara department Mr Sihturman: “They 
will speak as net surfers and as citizens, and will write responses that will look personal but will 
be based on a prepared list of messages that the Foreign Ministry developed” (quoted in Cook 
2009). These PR measures were deployed alongside the more explicitly violent bombing of 
Palestinian television and news stations throughout Gaza: this time Israel was taking no chances. 
 
Of victims and perpetrators  
 Two messages were central to Israel’s visual representation of the assault and they can be 
summarized by a simple typology: ‘it’s their fault, not ours’ and its corollary: ‘they started it’. 
Recycling old tropes of Israeli-Jewish victimhood, the core messages from the NID and the IDF-
SU were that Hamas broke the cease-fire agreements with Israel; that Israel’s objective is the 
defence of its population; and that Hamas is a terror organization targeting Israeli civilians
3
 
(Shabi 2009).  
 In September 2007 Gaza was officially declared a “hostile entity” by Israel’s Security 
Cabinet. Lisa Bhungalia (2010: 349) has argued that the deeming of Gaza as a hostile entity 
constructs a conceptual framework based upon “an ontological distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’: 
Gaza, the antagonistic, ‘otherized’ space...is set against the normalized, civilized space of Israel”. 
These orientalist tropes reduce the ongoing conflict to what she calls a post 9/11 “Manichean 
theatre comprised of humanity fighting the mujahideen, the besieded verses the barbaric”. What 
kind of people inhabit a space which has been designated “hostile”? The naming of territory is 
simultaneously a demarcation of the population who live there; that which appears as terroristic 
and hostile is simultaneously that which can – must even – be contained or, in the last resort, 
eliminated. The crucial thing here is that Israel is always and already the victim and Gaza and 
Hamas are always-already the perpetrators. The Israeli narrative establishes Israel as a besieged 
space, one which has been breached – unremittingly – by the others of Gaza. The narration of 
Israel as victim and the naming of Gaza as hostile are two faces of the same coin. Together they 
work to constitute every Israeli act as defensive. If Gaza is the aggressor then accordingly they 
started it; Israeli action is prefigured as a response to (rather than an instigation of) violence. As 
Zizek has pointed out, actions taken on the part of Palestinians are prefigured as ‘acts of terror’, 
and cited as ‘proof’ that Israel is, in fact, dealing with terrorists. This paradox, he argues, ‘”is 
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 The concept of the civilian is an especially complicated one in Israeli society because Israeli military operations 
rely on the mobilization of thousands of reservists who “shift from civilians to soldiers in a day” (King 2006, cited 
in Gregory 2004). The question of ‘who is a civilian?’ turns not only on  the question of ‘what is a civilian?’ but 
crucially also ‘when is what a civilian?’.  
inscribed into the very notion of a ‘war on terror’—a strange war in which the enemy is 
criminalized if he defends himself and returns fire” (cited in Bhungalia 2010: 356). The typology 
of Israel-as-victim/them-as-perpetrators is an important component within the “cultural resources 
and social systems through which images are interpreted and valued” (Campbell 2007: 361), 
which is to say that that these constructions underwrite and frame the ways in which audiences 
understand the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Israel, after all, is “only democracy in the 
Middle East” and in the western geo-political imagination it therefore follows that as "an island 
of freedom located in a region controlled by military dictators, feudal kings and religious leaders, 
Israel should receive unreserved support from western liberal states interested in strengthening 
democratic values around the globe" (Gordon 2004).  
Visual-legal performances 
 But the narration of Gaza as a hostile entity is not only a broad geo-political trope. IDF 
visualities substantiate, rationalize and legitimize these claims at the level of the image so that 
they become quotidian assumptions in popular news discourse. IDF visuals reproduce Gaza (and 
its people) as hostile by making two simple yet problematic claims. First, their images are 
intrinsically true. Second, because they are intrinsically true they can be used to make and 
substantiate legal claims about the enemy. IDF visual claims are therefore simultaneously legal 
claims.  
 
Figure 2: Hamas weapons. The original caption reads: “Weapons, including an anti-tank cannon, discovered in 
Jabaliya mosqueduring the Gaza Operation”, source: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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 Hamas activities “spotted in the schoolyard” tell us why Israel fired on schools: because 
they fired from schools.  The pointers tell us why Israel – “accidentally” – killed civilians: they – 
deliberately – fire from civilian areas. Why could Israel not seamlessly distinguish terrorists from 
civilians? They don’t wear uniform and therefore blend into the general population. They are 
Amitai Etzioni’s (2010) “abusive civilians” par excellence. Where Israel regrets the loss of life on 
both sides, Hamas intentionally attacks innocent Israeli ‘civilians’5. The plethora of weapons, the 
terrorists arsenal is paraded so we may witness its deathly scope, its unbearable intensity and 
visceral reality: these weapons exist (figure 2). Faces are revealed not to humanise but to 
demonstrate the inhumanity of those who kill at will, in the name of radical Islam and capital 'T' 
Terrorism. They don’t value life like we do6. These are performances of space that very much 
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 Pp. 60 IMFA ‘Operation Cast lead’ supra note 
5
 See supra note 2. 
6
 This is a common sentiment implicit in the ‘new wars’ discourse and also amongst many Israelis.  In an article 
published in the Israeli newspaper "Hassidic World" Yitzhak Ben-Zvi writes of the Arabs as “a cult of murderers, 
draw lines around the terroristic and barbaric space of the enemy. These are images that 
demonstrate the precarity of Israeli lives, the leakiness of the border and the perforations of space 
maintained by the terrorist other. The images perform Israeli space as constantly threatened and 
vulnerable (Figure 3). They present Gaza as a space saturated in terroristic backwardness, a 
space where hooded, faceless and thus unrecognisably human Hamas-figures forsake their own 
people for their radical fundamentalist cause. They use children and babies as human shields 
(figure 4); these are cowardly, immoral people inhabiting a corrupted and degenerate space. 
‘What kind of people’ these images rhetorically enquire “launch rocket attacks from within 
densely populated areas near schools and protected U.N. Facilities”? What kind of commander 
uses “hospitals as bases of operations and ambulances for transport”? What kind of enemy 
“stores weapons in mosques” and “booby-traps entire civilian neighbourhoods so that an attack 
on one structure would devastate many others”? (IMFA 2009: 2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
savages, and a loathsome nation [...they] are a people similar to donkeys… they have a great desire to murder and 
are even worse than the Nazi enemy (quoted in Nahmias 2006) 
 Figure 3: IDF Map of rocket ranges, source: IDF Spokesperson  
 Figure 4.  Hamas use of children as human shields, source: thediamongguru
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 The answer? Them, not us. Israel abides by the law, Hamas breaches it. These visualities 
produce Israeli space and practice as resolutely different and irreconcilable to the practices and 
spaces maintained by Hamas and Gaza. The scripting and visualization of Gaza as a necessarily 
terroristic space performs the spectral figures that inhabit that space as dubiously human. Indeed, 
as Judith Butler (2004: 89) has warned us, 
 “If we assume that everyone who is human goes to war like us, and that this is part of what 
 makes  them recognizably human, or that the violence we commit is violence that falls 
 within the realm of the recognizably human, but the violence that others commit is 
                                                          
7
 At: http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_aKt4nP-
9jd8/SWrCd7xIf4I/AAAAAAAAFaI/6LodWXQHTCU/s400/hush.bmp&imgrefurl=http://thediamondguru.blogspot.co
m/2009/01/israel-v-gaza-hamas.html&usg=__KSdXo2gugvX7bQA-
FyvMy3NYvRI=&h=279&w=400&sz=41&hl=en&start=0&sig2=R6O5iJRjo1ESWUYY8YfZlw&zoom=1&tbnid=A-
n5eBLPE3_6IM:&tbnh=149&tbnw=214&ei=JsmcTPy2IIamsQOyj63VAQ&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dhamas%2Bcartoon
%2Bhuman%2Bshields%2Bhush%26hl%3Den%26biw%3D1280%26bih%3D619%26gbv%3D2%26tbs%3Disch:1&itbs
=1&iact=hc&vpx=141&vpy=93&dur=101&hovh=187&hovw=269&tx=122&ty=57&oei=JsmcTPy2IIamsQOyj63VAQ&
esq=1&page=1&ndsp=18&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0 
 unrecognizable as human activity, then we make use of a limited and limiting cultural 
 frame to understand what it is to be human” 
 Israel’s visual-legal performance commits to a Manichean dichotomy between what Butler 
calls the recognisably human and the dubiously human. Once this rhetorical manoeuvre has been 
completed the very barbarity and excessive lawlessness of the enemy other serves to legitimise 
Israel and the means of violence employed during the assault. It is no longer simply that what 
Hamas is doing is deemed illegitimate by Israel. Their illegitimacy is now performed in images 
and in videos so that we may witness, in real time and via the unquestionable truth of the camera, 
their inhuman acts, their use of human shields and their cowardly hiding. Without the visual 
scripting of Gaza as a terrorist entity, without the imaging of Israel as victim, without the satellite 
images of rocket launch sites, and without the display of Hamas weapons, Israel’s claims would 
make little sense. The law is used to delegitimize the enemy while simultaneously legitimizing 
Israeli actions. What makes these visualities so compelling first and foremost is that they 
visualize legal ‘truths’, rendering often complex legal arguments transparent via the appeal to 
unmediated, disinterested objectivity. The most threatening claim made about the IDF in Gaza 
was that its actions were illegal and amounted to crimes of war
8
. In this sense it became doubly 
imperative for Israel to articulate a legal defence and offense that were remarkably simple and 
clear and yet which could also be articulated and disseminated widely through popular visual 
media. The beauty of all this is in the coming together of the visual and the legal in a discourse 
of truth and immediacy.   
 Israel’s claims do not have to be believed because they can be seen. The IDF videos posted 
on YouTube use indexical indicators that appeal to the intrinsic truth of images: “what we have 
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 This was the conclusion reached by the U.N. Fact-finding Mission in Gaza, commissioned by Sir Justice Richard 
Goldsone (see U.N. 2009) as well as a number of international NGO and human rights groups.  
behind me [on two television screens] is further evidence...”; “what this map proves is the way in 
which Hamas deliberately puts its own people directly in the line of fire...” “what you are about 
to see is actual footage taken from the cockpits of Israel aircraft that proves...” (IDF  2009). The 
images are speaking. It matters not what they say so much as whatever they claim is 
unquestionably true. They prove this by showing that. These rhetorical tricks appeal to the notion 
that seeing really is believing. But what is most interesting about these images is that without the 
apparatus of indexes, pointers, captions and voiceovers they simply make no sense. It is not 
obvious for example that the blurred figure in front of what we are told is a U.N. building is in-
fact a Hamas operative, just as it is impossible to tell whether the video purportedly showing 
Hamas operatives loading a truck full of missiles is not actually footage of civilians loading a 
truck full of oxygen canisters
9
. Images are not disinterested but are recruited to make arguments. 
Israel is profoundly interested in these images not for what they intrinsically communicate but 
precisely because Israel has learnt to communicate through and for the image. 
 IDF images do not speak for themselves, but are spoken for. Images always demand 
interpretation and the IDF assist the interpretation of its images with captions, directives, and 
explanatory tags. These indexical pointers become crucial to help mobilise condemnation (or 
conversely, give cause for celebration) of the violence depicted in images, so as to generate the 
'appropriate' response (Sliwinski 2004). The pointers and captions instruct us what to see and 
what to remember; multiple meanings are reduced to a single or narrow interpretation (Moller 
2007): its’ their fault, not ours because they are terrorists and they started it.  
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 On December 29 2009, the Israeli Air Force  killed eight civilians who they thought were loading missiles onto a 
truck. In July 2009 Israel published an investigation into the incident, concluding that, “In fact, the truck was 
carrying oxygen tanks and not rockets” (IMFA 2009: 146).  
Visual Economy 
 Images circulate in what Deborah Poole has called a ‘visual economy’. Poole argues that 
the idea of a visual economy is superior to the notion of visual culture because visual economy 
demands attention to the way “visual images [are] part of a comprehensive organization of 
people, ideas and objects” (Poole quoted in Campbell 2007: 361). In order to understand the 
significance of visuality in the production of geopolitics Campbell (2007: 357) draws from Poole 
and concludes that visual culture must recast as visual economy to “enable the constitutive 
relations of geopolitics and visuality to shift from the social construction of the visual field to the 
visual performance of the social field”. Images, never discreet objects, are part of a wider 
political assemblage that is made possible by – and is productive of – relations of power. These 
relations of power regulate and organize images at three different levels; the site(s) and spaces of 
production; the circulation of images and; the cultural resources and social systems through 
which images are interpreted and understood. Elsewhere, Campbell (2004) argues that the visual 
performance of the social field is structured by what he calls ‘economies of regulation’. Being 
aware of the complex ways in which images are subject to economies of production, circulation, 
consumption and endless regulation alerts us to the fact that “images do a lot of work: they 
visually perform the social field on which action can be made to occur, they testify to the 
conditions of the social field, and they can induce a responsibility in those concerned about the 
social field” (Campbell forthcoming, see also Keenan 2002). But the all important point remains: 
images cannot do this alone. Images enter social worlds and political contexts that exist prior to 
their shooting and circulation, and these contexts – be they geo-political, legal or economic – can 
determine what any image may (or may not) achieve.  The single image “cannot testify to what is 
revealed through it, but must be attached to another image, another piece of information, another 
assertion or description, another grievance or piece of evidence, another broadcast, another 
transmitter. An image is only ever another statement in a regime of statements.” (Azoulay 2009: 
191) Conceptualising the visual field of Gaza in terms of a visual economy means that images 
cannot be isolated as discrete objects but have to be “understood as imbricated in networks of 
materials, technologies, institutions, markets, social spaces, affects, cultural histories and 
political contexts” (Campbell 2007: 361).  
 
‘What the Arabs see’ 
 One of the most powerful counter-claims made in Palestinian coverage
10
 of the assault on 
Gaza was the representation of suffering and the display of dead bodies. Images of suffering, 
many of them graphic, reached an international audience and were found all over the (front) 
pages of international newspapers such as The Guardian, The Observer and The New York Times 
(see Campbell forthcoming). But what can these images achieve?  
 
 Many political practices rely on a techno-logic of the visual to validate their respective 
projects, and many rely on the circulation of abject imagery to illustrate and support their 
political claims (Moller 2007). The representation and communication of suffering is central to 
Palestinian identity (Allen 2009). Lori Allen (2009) and George Giacaman (2002) argue that 
suffering marks a particular moment in Palestinian history around the time of the First Intifada 
when Palestinians “discovered” human rights as the ideal language through which to make their 
voices heard. They are correct that the mobilization of suffering as a means of self-representation 
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 I take ‘Palestinian coverage’ to include professional and amateur journalists as well as citizens that were inside 
Gaza, reporting from a position sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and critical of Israel’s assault. While this broad 
definition homogenizes what is undoubtedly a heterogeneous collection of perspectives, I use it because according 
to many reports a so called ‘Palestinian perspective’ was clearly present in the reporting of the assault. I hope to 
challenge the usefulness of the category in what follows.     
reached critical mass around that time, but Palestinian suffering is, of course, much older. Al 
Nakba, the catastrophe (1948), signalled the immediate forcible removal of 711,000 Palestinians 
from their homes and land. Suffering remains one of the few constants for a people subject to 
Israel’s arbitrary and encroaching rule; violence and suffering has become normal, indeed 
increasingly normal since the Second Intifada (Allen 2008). In this way Palestinians have learnt 
to vie for empathy in what Bob (2002) has called a “global meritocracy of suffering in which all 
deserving causes attract international support”. Many feel that because suffering is an integral 
part of Palestinian life it should be represented in an unmediated fashion. Their argument is that 
the visceral nature of bodies and injury communicates better than anything else the infliction of 
pain and suffering by Israel. This is a common sentiment amongst Palestinians. Lori Allen 
(2009:161) for example, tells of how her friend Khader insisted on showing her images of 
mangled bodies and the aftermath of violent clashes from the Second Intifada. For Khader, 
images of suffering constitute irrefutable proofs of injustice: “the person who cares about 
humanity, it would affect them, and they could judge...let the world see and it will do 
something”. If suffering is not seen, it is not known and if it is not known then there can be no 
catalyst for change.  
 Al-Jazeera coverage of the assault showed Palestinian suffering in all its unedited detail. 
Their network was the only international broadcaster with reporters on both sides of the border, 
in Israel and Gaza (Al Jazeera 2009). The fact that Al Jazeera had six reporters on the ground 
even before the assault had begun was doubly significant as numerous other international news 
outlets began to rely on them for their information, images and footage (Cohen 2009). Habib 
Battah (2009), freelance journalist and media analyst based in Beirut and New York claims that 
the images captured by Palestinian journalists were “often broadcast unedited”. Typically: 
 “The cycle begins with rooftop-mounted cameras, capturing the air raids live. After 
moments of quiet, thunderous bombing commences and plumes of smoke rise over the 
skyline. Then,  anguish on the streets. Panicked civilians run for cover as ambulances 
careen through narrow alleys. Rescue workers hurriedly pick through the rubble, often 
pulling out mangled bodies. Fathers with tears of rage hold dead children up to the 
cameras, vowing revenge. The wounded are carried out in stretchers, gushing with blood. 
Later, local journalists visit the hospitals and more gruesome images, more dead children 
are broadcast. Doctors wrap up the tiny bodies and  carry them into overflowing 
morgues. The survivors speak to reporters. Their distraught voices  are heard around the 
region; the outflow of misery and destruction is constant” 
  
 Such was routine for the independent Palestinian journalists who lived the story they 
were reporting. Images of dead children and mangled bodies were commonplace; the suffering 
was laid bare for Arab audiences to see. The images and coverage of the assault by Al Jazeera 
demonstrate an unrelenting physical intimacy with death. Bodies were revealed in all their 
rawness, the emphasis on their “destroyed physiology was shown in a form” that according to 
Allen “accentuated that rawness” (2009 :171). A whole affective register and environment is 
created; families and friends weep and cry over dead bodies and crowds gather around to morn 
their lost ones, their Martyrs. The explicit coverage of the war by Arabic channels like Al Jazeera 
confirms Allen’s observation that suffering and victimization become central to humanizing the 
Palestinian subject. Palestinian visualities imagine and appeal to an ‘international community’ 
via a politics of immediation. A benevolent audience is assumed to exist and Palestinian bodies 
in all their visceral reality become the visual vehicle through which Palestinians hope to prove 
that they are legible as the ‘human’ in human-rights and humanitarian discourse.  
 In order to answer what such visualities are able to achieve it is first necessary to 
distinguish between what U.K.’s Channel 4 News John Snow (2009) has claimed are “two 
versions of the assault on Gaza” The first, he argues “is the moderated account aired in the West; 
the other is the unexpurgated account of civilian deaths filmed in vivid close-up inside Gaza”. 
Audiences are not pre-given but are constituted by and through discourse and as such the ‘two 
versions’ both respond to and reproduce audiences who already carry with them a series of 
assumptions, attitudes and values. But the question of what images might achieve relies on much 
more than who the audience are. There is also the question of how those images might be 
mediated, framed and regulated in the visual economy. While Snow’s distinction between what 
the “Arab” world saw and what the “West” saw is useful, it leads him to a problematic 
conclusion. He claims that “as with every military conflict, the inevitable first casualty is the 
truth”. Snow assumes that there is some irreducible and objective “truth” beneath the fog of war 
and in this context he is explicit that the “unexpurgated” Arab coverage provides such truth. This 
is an interesting counter to the claims made by Israel that their own account is the only true one. 
But by claiming that the “Western account” has been so reduced by the ban on journalists that the 
scale of protest has been dulled, Snow implies that if only “Western” audiences would have seen 
the “truth” (by which he means “wailing women running in the streets, carrying the wrapped 
remains of tiny children”) protest would have been automatic. This is an extremely problematic 
assumption which overlooks the above conversation about how images are mediated, framed and 
regulated not only by Israel’s media ban but by the visual economy and particularly the 
economies of regulation in our own media. If attention is shifted to focus on the visual 
economies of Gaza I suggest that Snow’s ‘two versions’ actually come to resemble each other 
and end up producing a narrative that is not too dissimilar from the Israeli narrative. 
What we (don’t) see 
 Palestinians shared a hope that the world would see their suffering. But many western 
audiences do not like to see the worst of war and there has been a move toward filtering explicit 
content via the protocols of ‘taste and decency’. Taste and decency involves the media regulating 
the representation of death and atrocity so that bodies “dissappear” – or rather, do not appear in 
the first place (Campbell 2004). The economies of taste and decency are entrenched today and 
examples abound. One of the most high profile cases recently was when the U.S. Senate barred 
news photographs of the flag-covered coffins of service members killed in Iraq (see Stolberg 
2002).  This is not an exceptional case but are the norm according to which much of the raw 
footage from Gaza was edited. Picture editor of The Independent, Sophie Batterbury wrote about 
how she handled some of the 300 images that reached her desk on the first morning of Israel’s 
attack. She recalls a “number of images showing dead and dismembered bodies, some of which 
were relatively mild in tone and others which were so horrific that I couldn't look at them any 
larger than thumbnails” (quoted in Campbell forthcoming: 12). It was not that such images were 
not available: they were in abundance. In Campbells’ analysis of the coverage of the war by the 
U.K.’s Guardian and Observer, he claims that only a handful of images showed dead and 
maimed bodies. In another example, editor Julian Rake recounts of the way in which Reuters 
edits footage and images before they sent them out to newspapers and news stations around the 
world. Rake defends a decision not to air the full footage of a burnt baby, five month old, being 
removed from the back of an ambulance by a doctor
11
: “what we did was we showed, a sanitised 
if you like, yea a sanitised version...in my view putting that other stuff [the graphic footage] 
wouldn’t have added to your understanding, to my understanding of what happened” (quoted in 
Channel 4 2009).  
 Yet ‘sanitization’ of such footage is never only about public understanding, but is 
productive of publics and public understanding. The shying away from the explicit that these 
examples demonstrate is at the same time a shying away from the most pressing issues of the 
day: life and death. If the unsanitized picture is a weapon for Palestinians then the editing of gore 
is also a kind of sanitization of the Palestinian cause. If missing limbs, severed heads and broken 
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bodies cannot be seen, perhaps the dead just vanished.  If seeing is believing, what about that 
which is not seen, is it rendered necessarily unbelievable? Numbers are easier to digest than 
explicit images of the body in pain, just as numbers of fallen soldiers are easier to digest than 
images of their coffins. The coffin bespeaks the body it holds; the body in severe pain bespeaks 
its unrepresentability, hence the discomfort it causes. There was possibly no ‘need’ for Reuters to 
send out such horrific and graphic footage just like there was no ‘need’ to print numerous images 
of dead Iraqi’s in the British and U.S. press. At one level one might sympathise with the decision 
to edit such images. Images of suffering are not an injunction to action as is so often hoped; the 
problem of ‘compassion fatigue’ (Moeller 1999) is by now well documented. The compassion 
fatigue thesis argues that the abundant supply of imagery dulls our senses and creates a 
syndrome of communal inaction. It is also worth noting that the displaying of dead bodies partly 
reproduces the violence represented in the image, normalizing death and suffering. In this view 
the proliferation of images of “just more Palestinians dying” are read as naturalized and 
generalized statements of horror. The problem with this view is that it intersects all too closely 
with a discursive turn in the representation of war as something else other than the infliction of 
mass death and suffering. It also intersects dangerously with IDF visual narratives which erase 
images of death from war or construe death as necessary collateral damage in the fight of good 
against evil. In this way the turn toward ‘taste and decency’ is simultaneously a turning away not 
just from the realities of war but from a way of representing war that “we” in the west find 
excessive and voyeuristic.   
 In the end it is not only ‘their’ wars that are so different to our own but also the very way 
in which they represent their wars. Apparently the Arab world abandons “truth” in pursuit of 
“images of carnage and emotional narratives” (Fleishman and Rafei 2009). As the assault on 
Gaza wore on and such images proliferated on Arab news stations, the Jerusalem Post described 
the coverage as “voyeuristic, nearly pornographic”. Something about Palestinian representational 
forms and its proximity to the graphic repulses not only the Jerusalem Post. As the Los Angeles 
Times would have it: “Al Jazeera and other Arab media outlets have grown more objective in 
reporting in recent years, but when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, balanced coverage 
is often outweighed by pathos and narratives of funeral corteges proceeding amid the sounds of 
explosions” (Fleishman and Rafei 2009). Arab media outlets (all of them) just can’t help 
themselves when it comes to this conflict. Such renderings of Arabic representational forms are 
used to denounce the authenticity and trustworthiness of “their” media; their proximity to death 
is framed as necessarily biased. As one commentator recently said of Al-Jazeera’s coverage of 
Israel’s illegal assault on the Mavi Marmara Aid Flotialla, “it was about as fair as cutting one leg 
off a chicken and sticking it in a fox-run” (Spencer 2010). Indeed, this was the sentiment of the 
Israeli state when two months after the assault on Gaza Israel launched a boycott of al-Jazeera, 
accusing it of “bias” because it had covered the Gaza incursion but not the Palestinian rocket 
attacks against the Israeli city of Ashkelon (BBC 2008). Yet all this is marked by a stunning 
irony: the IDF rely on precisely the same fiction that their images and footage are unmediated 
and are therefore true. The act of boycotting al-Jazeera on account of “bias” is a rhetorical act 
which elides the fact that Israeli coverage too is profoundly – necessarily – biased and mediated. 
That Israel went as far as to ban foreign press from Gaza sheds light on the contradictions and 
double-standards in the IDF narrative.  
Equivocating suffering, eliminating politics  
 From time to time, the screen that insulated western audiences from Gaza was ruptured 
by photographs transmitted via email by Gazan photographers – unbearable images of severe 
harm to civilians (Azoulay 2009). Very few of these were printed in Israeli daily press
12
. But 
when these images did find outlet in international media they were blunted by two further 
economies of regulation.  
 
Figure 5. Washington Post Front Page, Source: Al Jazeera
13
 
 
 
 
 First, Palestinian suffering was often presented alongside Israeli suffering. The New York 
Times online ran a retrospective on Gaza entitled “Photographer’s Journal: A War’s Many 
Angles” 14. Under the aegis of ‘fairness’ and ‘objectivity’ the feature comprised two sets of 
photographs, one from Israel taken by Moises Saman and the other from Gaza taken by Tyler 
Hicks. The photographers provide voiceover audio testimony that begins when the viewer views 
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on the front page of Israel’s leading newspaper. Instead Yediot Ahronot ran a story on an Israeli dog killed by a 
Kassam rocket. Scroll to page 16 and there were two lines about the Palestinian deaths. (Levy 2010; Hari 2010) 
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the first image. Flicking through the images one is compelled to feel compassion not only for the 
Palestinians but for Israeli’s as well. Both sides bury their loved ones; both sides have their 
widows. Symmetries are established by bullet-holes and bombed out homes: destruction is 
wrought on both sides. A similar ‘balance’ was struck by the Washington Post who ran a front 
page story with images of two distraught children clinging to their mothers: On the left, a 
Palestinian mother who lost five children (figure 5). On the right an equal-sized picture of an 
Israeli woman who was “distressed by the fighting”. The presentation of mutual suffering 
rhetorically produces the media as disinterested harbingers of truth. The BBC displayed this 
sentiment when it refused to give airtime to the Disasters Emergency Committee appeal for 
funds to aid Gaza. Director General Marc Thompson claimed that airing the appeal would pose a 
“danger for the BBC” because it “...could be interpreted as taking a political stance on an 
ongoing story”. These editorial decisions discursively construct the media as apolitical while 
ironing over the differences between Israeli and Palestinian suffering.  
 What about the assault on Gaza was equal and symmetric? What about the reporting of 
war has ever been “objective”? In the NYT retrospective there is a strange absence of action in 
the Israeli set of images. It is particularly strange given that the positioning of Moises Saman’s 
photographs reveal that he was embedded with the IDF at the time. As Lagerquist (2009: 88) 
points out: “Not a single one is shooting, loading a gun, or cleaning a tank barrel. Plumes of 
smoke across the border are pictured only distantly, one of them from some elevation, unfurling 
elegiacally from a remote, empty beach. It is as if some other army were in the process of killing 
fourteen hundred people”. In 1991 the then Chief Spokesman for the IDF, Nachman Shai 
recommended the attachment of media teams to military units, a measure he assured would 
“have a definite impact on local and world opinion and, in the long run, will be to our benefit” 
(1998: 15). Embedding journalists would become official IDF policy. This is precisely why none 
of this can be construed as ‘fair’, ‘unbiased’ reporting. Journalists embedded on the front line 
construct a very partial way of seeing. Moises Saman’s choice of location was not coincidental; 
he was based in the Israeli town of Ashkelon, one of the main towns that was receiving rocket 
fire from Gaza.   
 It is disingenuous to present Palestinian suffering alongside Israeli suffering under the 
aegis of objectivity because the scale and intensity of violence are incomparable. Israel launched 
a full-scale military assault on a largely (or wholly) defenceless civilian population. Numbers 
matter. Fourteen hundred Palestinians died. The number was eleven for Israel. The tactic of 
claiming objectivity renders the suffering of Palestinians illegible on its own terms. Palestinians 
can suffer only so far as and as much as Israelis are seen to be suffering. To show Israeli 
suffering as comparable to Palestinian suffering is a profoundly political act that is, as Major 
Avital Leibovich admits, “favourable to Israel” (quoted in Shabi 2009). We must resist such 
attempts to parallel Palestinian and Israeli suffering, not only because doing so draws a moral 
equivalence between the Israeli woman who is tired of war and the Palestinian woman who has 
lost all of her children (Figure 5), but because Palestinian suffering, identity and agency is 
subsumed by a generalized suffering of both sides.  
 Those pictoral representations of suffering that made it past the economies of taste and 
equivalence “reproduced” according to Campbell (forthcoming: 25) “a humanitarian subjectivity 
that is consistent with continued Israeli governance of the Occupied Territories”15. Campbell 
locates the efficacy of the ban at precisely the point at which the ban itself appears to fail, the 
point at which images find their way out of Gaza. Campbell argues that it is in these images that 
“we have the production of Palestinians as “humanitarian clients”” a category which “severely 
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limits their political agency regardless of the intentions of those who took or published the 
pictures”16. This leads him to the conclusion that although newspapers like (but not limited to) 
The Guardian might have thought the publication of photographs of personal and infrastructural 
devastation offered a critical perspective on the conflict, they actually represent Gaza as a 
humanitarian catastrophe which is both temporary and somehow beyond the political. Campbell 
is quite correct to assert that the humanitarian emergency that ensued during and after the assault 
was “neither an emergency previously unknown nor a condition beyond politics” (pp. 27). 
Rather, as Israeli Philosopher Adi Ophir (2009) has shown with such perspicacity, Israel has long 
governed Gaza by an “ongoing measured and calculated catastrophization”: “the scope of 
destruction and the number of civilian casualties [in Gaza] are first and foremost a temporary 
change in the mode of catastrophization: airplane bombs are added to the closure, artillery shells 
go hand in hand with the cutoff of electricity and the destruction of the sewage system”. 
Carefully managed disaster is not the exception in Gaza but the norm. Humanitarian framings, 
framings which both Palestinian and international coverage work within propagate the sense that 
the violence is temporary and exceptional, deflecting attention away from the fact that the 
exceptional has become normal and the temporary, permanent. Occupation bleeds into war and 
back again, but the audience cannot see this in the iconography of humanitarian disaster. Does 
peace follow war? It surely depends on how one defines those misleadingly oppositional terms. 
 
Exposing frames: violences within 
 The problems of productively challenging Israeli visual representations are manifold. The 
Palestinian representational form of showing suffering is inadequate on at least two accounts. 
First, western media elide Palestinian suffering, either via direct censorship or by showing it 
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alongside Israeli suffering. But even when Palestinian suffering is seen it is necessary to ask how 
it is framed, which brings us to a second problem. Representational framings of Gaza as a hostile 
entity proscribe Palestinians as spectrally human; their lives cannot be grieved because 
ultimately they – the terrorists – brought the assault upon themselves by firing rockets and 
blowing themselves up. The pictoral representations which hope, precisely, to challenge this 
perspective end up re-locating Palestinian lives in a humanitarian catastrophe over which ‘they’ 
(the Palestinians and the audience) have little control. The Israeli occupation disappears from 
view and it is hoped that the war will come to a swift and peaceful end: when the dreadful 
images stop, then the dreadful acts they represent presumably come to an end too. ‘Operation 
Cast-Lead’ may have ended, but the suffering continues under an occupation which Israel refuses 
even to acknowledge, let alone to bear responsibility for under the international law of 
occupation.  
 If such a diagnosis looks dim, I would argue that it is representative of the situation in 
Gaza today. The U.N. enquiry headed by Sir. Richard Goldstone into war crimes in Gaza has 
yielded little in the way of actual change, still less by way of justice. U.S. veto power will ensure 
that the Goldstone Report and others like it will not make their way to the International Criminal 
Court. And even if they did, the broken U.N. Resolutions scattered throughout Israeli history 
point to the fact that Israel is in-fact above the law, not subject to it. No justice will be done as 
far as the law is concerned. Neither will concession be paid by Israel in terms of renewing the 
peace talks: at present settlement expansion looks set to continue, rendering the peace talks 
futile. The border restrictions may have been eased since the Mavi Marmara affair in May 2010, 
but Israel still retains effective control of Gaza’s air, land and sea space.  
 The IDF was well aware that damaging and sensitive images would get out of Gaza 
during and after the assault. It is worth asking whether this marks not so much an oversight as a 
worryingly sophisticated understanding by Israeli PR technicians of the ways in which visual 
economies work. Israeli visual representations combined the overt regulation of images via the 
ban, but they also relied upon the covert and unspoken regulations of the visual economy that 
would end up privileging the Israeli narrative over its counter narratives. But perhaps what the 
IDF continues to underestimate is the power of the visual archive to circulate, change and 
generate new meanings. In this spirit Judith Butler has asked what happens to the visual fields of 
war when “the mandatory framings become part of the story”; what if “there is a way to 
photograph the frame itself”?17 Was it not precisely a ‘framing of the frame’ that we saw in the 
image and footage of the journalists stranded atop the hill outside Gaza? Parash hill became 
infamous during the assault; journalists called it the “hill of shame”. They choose this name 
because hundreds of Israeli civilians climbed the hill to watch the show of Gaza burning. They 
posed for other exalted Israeli’s while making ‘victory’ signs for the camera (Figure 6). The 
story told through this image, and through others like it is that Israel does not believe in the 
freedom of press, that Israel does not want the world to see its punishment of Gaza. The IDF 
media ban becomes part of the story; the frame constructed and sought by the IDF is quite 
literally framed at the same time as a violent inflection of Israeli society is exposed. That which 
constituted the frame, he who organized our gaze is brought into view. It is at moments like this 
that we might realise what we have seen is not some balanced, even less objective, view of the 
assault. Rather, we see how our seeing has been regulated by a powerful state that is invested in 
perpetuating catastrophe in Gaza through a series of politicized and often dehumanizing frames. 
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 Figure 6. Israelis gathered on a hill near Gaza to see the "show" during one of the last days of bombing by the 
Israeli Air Force, January 2009, source: Ariella Azoulay, photograph by Miki Kratsman 
 Just as the assault on Gaza continues so the visual archive will continue to expand, 
circulate and sediment. There have already been renewed attempts by Israel to regulate the visual 
field since the assault on Gaza: in the attacks on the Mavi Marmara flotilla we witnessed the 
conjoining of the Israeli imagefare and warfare apparatus once again. “Everything” was filmed: 
the humanitarians attacked first, they had weapons, they were not actually humanitarians, but 
terrorists
18
. These are familiar tropes but I would suggest that today they are tropes which are 
being contested. I say this not only because the flotilla incident caused at least some momentary 
outrage in the international community. The Mavi Marmara flotilla was never going to reach 
Gaza, but that was not the intention of those on board. The aim was to expose the siege of Gaza, 
to reveal the truth that Gaza is still under the sovereignty of Israel. The violence of the Israeli 
state was exposed on that day, May 31 2010, as IDF boarded the Mavi Marmara and executed 
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 All these claims have been made by Israel and the IDF (see this video shot by the IDF which purportedly shows 
those aboard the Mavi Marmara using pre-emptory violence against IDF 
troops:http://www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk#p/a/u/0/gYjkLUcbJWo) See also IDF 2010 
nine Turkish passengers, some of them at point blank range. Could it not be that the Mavi 
Marmara incident provides at least a start point in answering the question raised by David 
Campbell: “how can the permanent emergency of catastrophization in Gaza be pictured?” There 
was no “war” on in Gaza that day; it was a day like any other, nothing exceptional: siege, 
struggle and survival. But what is war if not this? The visualities of the flotilla throw light on the 
fact that the catastrophes embodied in the siege of Gaza are permanent: everyday Gazan’s are 
subject to Israeli rule and a calorie count custom-made by Israel’s best. In 2006 Dov Weissglass, 
Chief Advisor to the then Prime Minister Areal Sharon, defended the blockade of Gaza thus: “the 
idea to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not make them die of hunger" (quoted in Urquhart 
2006).  
 
Figure 7. Eden Abergil sparked the outrage when she posted pictures of herself with Palestinian captives on her 
Facebook page, source: Guardian.co.uk., photograph by Getty Images/AFP 
 
 Israel’s marked loss of control over the public narrative that followed the flotilla episode 
narrative has caused no small amount of consternation in Israel (Levy 2010). As one 
commentator put it, “we are being indisputably beaten hands down on the PR uses of this new 
technology [internet social media]. We may be a start up nation, but we are bricks and mortar 
communicators” (Mirzroch 2010). Just two months after the Flotilla killings and Israel and the 
IDF were back in the news, this time for a series of photos uploaded to Facebook by a former 
IDF soldier. The pictures showing Eden Abergil posing in-front of blindfolded Palestinian 
prisoners under the caption ‘best time of my life’ “raised a storm” in Israel and beyond (see 
figure 7). In the exposé that followed, Israeli newspapers reported on the prevalence of this 
digital activity.  Haaretz news ran the headline ‘Facebook photos of soldiers posing with bound 
Palestinians are the norm’ alongside a series of images depicting IDF soldiers striking various 
poses next to dead or gagged Palestinians. One does not have to view the whole series to realise 
that these photographs bear some terrifying similarity to those of the torture in Abu Ghraib. The 
photographs of Abu Ghraib revealed that violence in the name of civilization reveals its own 
barbarism (Butler 2009: 93). Is not a kind of barbarism framed in Israel’s own visualities? Does 
the violence dealt out to Gaza, to the Mavi Marmara and repeated everyday in Gaza not speak of 
a profoundly violent state?  The loss of control Israel so fears is already in the past. As the visual 
archive circulates so Israel has become its own worst enemy.  
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